The question of whether Israel strategically "boosted" Hamas to undermine the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the two-state solution is a subject of significant historical analysis and political debate. Extensive documentation from historians, former intelligence officials, and political scientists suggests that while the relationship was not a formal alliance, Israeli policy—particularly under Benjamin Netanyahu—often functioned to maintain a divided Palestinian leadership, thereby weakening the secular, pro-negotiation Fatah-led PA in favor of the more radical Hamas.

Historical Context of the Two-State Solution and Hamas

The two-state solution, first proposed by the British Peel Commission in 1937 and later by the 1947 UN Partition Plan, became the centerpiece of international diplomacy following the 1967 Six-Day War.[1] The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the precursor to the PA, officially accepted the concept of a two-state solution in 1988, recognizing Israel's right to exist within the pre-1967 borders.[2] This shift led to the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, which established the Palestinian Authority as a governing body intended to be a stepping stone toward full statehood.[3]

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Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded in 1987 during the First Intifada. Unlike the PLO, Hamas’s original 1988 charter called for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in all of Mandatory Palestine.[4] This fundamental ideological rift between the secular Fatah (which controlled the PA) and the Islamist Hamas created a "divide and rule" opportunity that various Israeli administrations utilized to argue that there was "no partner for peace."[5]

The "Divide and Rule" Strategy

Scholars and journalists have documented a specific pattern where the Israeli government, particularly under Likud leadership, viewed the PA’s pursuit of statehood through international diplomacy as a greater threat than Hamas’s militancy. The rationale was that a unified Palestinian leadership under the PA could successfully pressure Israel into territorial concessions in the West Bank.[6]

1. Early Support for the Mujama al-Islamiya: In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Israeli military administration in Gaza allowed the precursor to Hamas, the Mujama al-Islamiya, to flourish as a counterweight to the secular nationalists of the PLO. Former Israeli officials, such as Brig. Gen. Yitzhak Segev, have admitted that the Israeli government provided some funding and legal recognition to these Islamist groups to weaken the PLO.[7]
2. The Netanyahu Era and the "Asset" Doctrine: Under Benjamin Netanyahu’s various terms as Prime Minister, the policy of keeping the PA and Hamas separate became more pronounced. In 2015, Bezalel Smotrich, a key member of Netanyahu’s later coalitions, famously stated that "the Palestinian Authority is a burden, and Hamas is an asset," because Hamas’s international status as a terrorist organization prevented any progress toward a Palestinian state.[8]
3. Financial Lifelines to Gaza: Between 2018 and 2023, Netanyahu’s government facilitated the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars from Qatar into the Gaza Strip. While ostensibly for humanitarian aid and civil servant salaries, critics and former Israeli security officials argue this was a deliberate move to keep Hamas functional enough to govern Gaza, thereby ensuring the Palestinian leadership remained split between the West Bank and Gaza.[9] [10]

Israeli Internal Criticism and Intelligence Perspectives

The assertion that Israel boosted Hamas is not merely a Palestinian claim; it has been voiced by high-ranking Israeli figures. Ami Ayalon, former head of the Shin Bet (Israel's internal security service), has argued that Israel’s refusal to empower the PA left a vacuum that Hamas filled.[11] Similarly, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak has noted that Netanyahu’s strategy was to keep Hamas "alive and kicking" to prevent the "nightmare" of a two-state solution.[12]

The Israeli Likud party’s 1977 manifesto explicitly stated that "between the sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty," a position that Netanyahu has reiterated as recently as 2024.[1] By allowing Hamas to remain a potent force, the Israeli government could point to the group's radicalism as proof that a Palestinian state would be a "terror state," effectively stalling the diplomatic process that the PA was attempting to navigate.[13]

Hamas’s Evolution and the 2017 Charter

In 2017, Hamas issued a revised political document that suggested a willingness to accept a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, though it stopped short of recognizing Israel’s legitimacy.[14] This move was seen by some as a pragmatic shift toward the PA’s position. However, the Israeli government largely dismissed this as a tactical ruse. The subsequent 2023 conflict has further complicated these dynamics, with Netanyahu’s government facing intense domestic criticism for the "conception" that Hamas could be contained through economic incentives while the PA was diplomatically sidelined.[15] [16]